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Abstract 
 
The private market benefits of education, i.e. the wage premia of graduates, are widely studied at 
the micro level, although the magnitude of their macroeconomic impact is disputed. However, there 
are additional benefits of education, which are less well understood but could potentially drive 
significant macroeconomic impacts. Following the taxonomy of McMahon (2009) we identify four 
different types of benefits of education. These are: private market benefits (wage premia); private 
non market benefits (own health, happiness, etc.); external market benefits (productivity spillovers; 
and external non-market benefits (crime rates, civic society, democratisation, etc.). Drawing on 
available microeconometric evidence we use a micro-to-macro simulation approach (Hermannsson 
et al, 2010) to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of external benefits of higher education. We 
explore four cases:  technology spillovers from HEIs; productivity spillovers from more skilled 
workers in the labour market; reduction in property crime; and the potential overall impact of 
external and private non-market benefits. Our results suggest that the external economic benefits of 
higher education could potentially be very large. However, given the dearth of microeconomic 
evidence this result should be seen as tentative. Our aim is to illustrate the links from education to 
the wider economy in principle and encourage further research in the field. 
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1. Introduction  
We are on the cusp of a major “natural experiment” in the UK, where potentially 
radically different funding mechanisms for Higher Education look likely to be 
deployed across the regions of the UK. The proposals for England largely reflect the 
recommendations of the Browne (2010) report. It emphasises the private benefits that 
graduates receive and argues that it is therefore reasonable that individuals should be 
expected to pay for these benefits through higher fees. In the case of Arts and Social 
Sciences, at least, there is to be no continuing public subsidy (although the loans will 
be subsidised). From an economics perspective, such a proposal would only be 
socially efficient if the external benefits of higher education in these subject areas 
were precisely zero (at least in England), though no evidence was offered on this issue 
by Browne (2010). On the other hand the Scottish Government has decided on no 
“upfront” fees and no “backdoor” graduate contribution either.1 Again, from an 
economics perspective this would be the socially optimal solution only if the 
anticipated future public/private distribution of costs of HE exactly reflects the excess 
of external over private benefits of higher education. It would be purely fortuitous if 
either implicit judgement about the external benefits of HE was correct. 
In this paper four different types of returns to (or benefits of) education are 
differentiated (see Table 1.1): private market returns, private non-market returns, 
external market returns and external non-market returns to education. Private market 
returns to education are the labour market benefits enjoyed by individuals who 
possess a higher level of education. They manifest themselves in higher earnings and 
lower unemployment rates. Private non-market returns to education are the benefits 
enjoyed by people with a higher level of education outside of the labour market. They 
include positive effects on health, longevity, happiness and many other benefits (for 
detailed discussion see McMahon, 2009, chapter 4). External returns to education (or 
externalities) refer to benefits enjoyed by the wider society if its members chose to 
acquire higher level of education. External market returns are expressed in terms of 
higher wages and higher profits and are reflected in GDP per capita, but they are not 
“internalised” by graduates or HEI institutions and are enjoyed by other agents in the 
                                                        
1 Of course, this raises concerns about a possible “funding gap” of HE in Scotland as compared to 
England. Estimates of the scale of this gap are provided in the Expert Group Report (2011). 
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economy. Examples would include the higher productivity and wages of non-
graduates generated by working with graduates and HEIs’ contribution to R&D and 
innovation (of a public good nature). External non-market returns improve quality of 
life, but are not necessarily directly translatable into pecuniary benefits. Examples 
would include any HE-induced: reduction in crime levels; improvements in public 
health, democratisation and political stability. 
Table 1.1 Classification of returns to education 
 Who benefits 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
b
en
ef
it
 
Private market returns 
Higher wages 
Higher employment 
Lower unemployment 
External market returns 
Higher productivity of other workers 
(productivity spillovers) 
Higher TFP due to knowledge spillover 
Private non-market returns 
Better own health 
Longer life expectancy 
Improvement in happiness  
External non-market returns 
Lower crime 
Democratisation 
Civic society 
There exist numerous studies of the private market benefits of education in general 
and higher education in particular, which are reviewed, for example, by Blundell et al 
(1999) and Psacharaopoulos and Patrinos (2004). While the results of these studies do 
vary depending on data sets, chosen control variables and specific econometric 
methods, there is no doubt at all that higher education yields substantial private 
market benefits in the form of increased earnings over the lifetime of a graduate, often 
expressed in terms of a private rate of return to higher education. Among the most 
influential studies in a UK context are Blundell et al (2000, 2005) and in a US context 
Heckman et al (2000, 2008). Estimates of the UK wage premium often mention 
estimated rates of return of around 10%, but significantly higher returns have been 
reported (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence these 
returns have been increasing, not decreasing, in the face of the dramatic increase in 
the HE participation rates in the UK and elsewhere, suggesting that demand for 
graduates’ skills is increasing at an even greater rate than the supply of them (e.g. 
Machin and McNally, 2007). 
Unfortunately, however, there are few, if any, studies of the scale of external benefits 
of HE in the regions of the UK, or indeed to the UK as a whole (though see McMahon 
and Oketch, 2010). This is unfortunate, since for the appropriate formulation of 
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policy, from the perspective of society as a whole, it is the total costs and benefits 
generated by HE that really matter. If total rates of return to higher education are 
higher than private rates this suggests underinvestment in higher education by society 
as a whole. The solution would be to induce greater investment in higher education, 
and vice versa if the opposite were to hold. Furthermore, it is widely recognised that 
private individuals’ higher education investment decisions should, in principle, be 
based on their total returns from higher education, including any non-market returns. 
If the latter are positive, as seems clear from what we know of the links from 
education to health and longevity (e.g. Grossman, 2005), these returns (or rather those 
elements of them that do not overlap with market returns) should be added to the 
private market benefit. If private non-market returns are not taken into consideration, 
the suggestion is that there may be private underinvestment in higher education.  
Few researchers in this area go beyond simply acknowledging the potential 
importance of non-market and external returns. This is understandable: it is extremely 
difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the earnings differentials attributable to higher 
education per se from thorough analysis of large microeconomic databases; but it is 
even more difficult to arrive at convincing estimates of the external returns to 
education. There is a natural tendency to focus on those effects that are easier to 
measure. Furthermore, there is undoubtedly scepticism among conventional 
neoclassical economists about the likely scale of externalities from higher education. 
As McMahon (2009) argues, perhaps this is in part due to a tendency to, in effect, 
“control away” some of the possible external impacts of HEIs.2 Yet the potential 
policy significance of these external impacts of HEIs is such that it seems essential to 
explore this systematically, and consider whether mainstream scepticism is justified 
by the available evidence. 
In Section 2 of the paper, we briefly review the methods that have been used in 
attempts to estimate the external benefits of education in general and higher education 
in particular. This includes a discussion of the approach that has tended to dominate in 
the UK focussing on the “macroeconomic returns” to education from growth studies 
that include human capital measures. Essentially, these are regarded as returns 
inclusive of aggregate externalities, from which microeconomic estimates of private 
                                                        
2 The judgment is that some researchers incorporate control variables (such as occupation) that 
effectively absorb part of the contribution that may in fact be attributable to higher education. 
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(market) returns can be deducted to reveal the existence, scale and sign of any 
externalities. This “macro-less-micro” approach is not the only one, however, and we 
briefly review others, including the Wolfe and Haveman (e.g. 2003) household-
production-function-based method and McMahon’s (e.g. 2009) dynamic simulation 
method. 
In Section 3 we apply the “micro-to-macro” approach to identifying the system-wide 
consequences of the external returns to higher education that we applied in our 
analysis of private market benefits of higher education in Hermannsson et al (2010). 
In that study we explore the system-wide impacts of micro-econometric estimates of 
private market returns to higher education by incorporating these as stimuli to labour 
productivity in a purpose-built, HEI-disaggregated, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of Scotland. In the present study we adopt a similar approach, but here 
use the (predominantly) micro-econometric estimates of particular examples of 
external returns to higher education to explore their likely system-wide impacts. We 
also briefly illustrate the importance of the scale of overall external returns to higher 
education. 
Given the comparative dearth of micro-econometric evidence of external returns in 
the UK, we are compelled to draw on evidence that is not Scottish (and, in some 
instances, not even UK based) in order to implement our approach. Furthermore, 
some of the evidence that we draw on is itself controversial, reflecting the difficulties 
that beset attempts to measure accurately the external returns to education, and the 
comparatively limited body of research that has been devoted to this to date (in 
comparison to the research on the private market returns to education). Despite the 
difficulties, this analysis has substantial potential importance for policy. Moreover, 
part of the motivation for this work is more clearly to identify the gaps in our 
knowledge of the external impacts of higher education in the UK and its regions. 
Future research will have to close these gaps if it is to provide the kind of evidence 
base that would be required to inform fully education policy in the UK. 
Given these qualifications the results of our model simulations must be regarded as 
exploratory and somewhat speculative. We illustrate our approach by (1) analysing 
the impact of technology spillovers from HEIs to firms in Scotland drawing on 
evidence from Harris et al (2011, 2012), (2) considering the likely system-wide 
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effects of productivity spillovers from graduates to non-graduates based on Moretti 
(2004) and (3) estimating potential system-wide effects from reduction in property 
crime based on Machin et al (2011). Finally, we briefly investigate the likely scale of 
system-wide impacts of overall external returns to higher education of the magnitude 
identified by McMahon (2009) and calculated using the “macro-less-micro” 
approach. 
The micro-to-macro approach to the external impacts of higher education should 
prove capable, in principle at least, of analysing the system-wide ramifications of any 
individual higher education externality or any combination of externalities, so that, for 
example, any interactions among them can be revealed. However, to be convincing 
the implementation of the approach must ultimately be based upon a range of micro-
econometric studies of higher education externalities in the UK that is comparable in 
quality to those that currently exist for the private market returns. In our brief 
conclusions in Section 5 we therefore focus primarily on the further research that 
would be required to allow a full micro-to-macro analysis of the external (and private 
non-market) returns to higher education in Scotland and the other regions of the UK.  
 
2. Approaches to valuing the externalities associated with higher education. 
This section of the paper provides a brief review of each of the main approaches to 
measuring (and valuing) the external and private non-market returns to higher 
education. The review can be brief because an extensive account is available in 
McMahon (2009). 
One approach is based on the macroeconomic growth-accounting literature, which 
was the original source of the famous “residual” in GDP per capita growth that could 
not be explained by labour or capital growth and was interpreted as reflecting 
“technical change”. The approach can be straightforwardly extended to incorporate 
the impact of education (see e.g., Stevens and Weale, 2004). While the accounting 
attribution approach is interesting, it cannot resolve the issues of causality. 
The most widely used approach, which at least in principle overcomes many of the 
limitations of the growth accounting approach is what we term the “macro less micro” 
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approach (Topel, 1999; Heckman and Klenow, 1997). Here macroeconomic growth 
models (either neoclassical growth models with disaggregated labour input or one of 
the variants of endogenous growth models) are estimated and interpreted as capturing 
the total (private plus external) market returns to education in general, or higher 
education in particular. There exist a number of relevant reviews here, including one 
on the macroeconomic returns to education (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003) - though 
there is rather less research on higher education per se - and on the potential role for 
higher education within endogenous growth models (Gemmell, 1996). Conventional 
micro-econometric estimates of private market returns (such as those reported in 
Blundell et al, 2000, 2005) are subtracted from the macroeconomic returns estimated 
from macroeconomic growth models (with disaggregated labour input) to yield 
estimates of external returns.  
The literature is valuable, but the assumption is that all relevant externalities are 
captured by aggregate models, and there are numerous issues of specification, 
estimation, interpretation and observational equivalence. In particular, there is no 
clear resolution yet of whether human capital impacts on the levels of per capita GDP 
or its growth rate. UK evidence suggests positive externalities, US evidence is less 
clear cut (with a suggestion perhaps of signalling effects and negative externalities) 
(Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 
Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003). Furthermore, this approach can at best provide an 
estimate of aggregate externalities that are reflected in GDP (i.e., external market 
returns), with no identification of the source of these. Nor can it hope to identify 
transmission mechanisms or indicate the scale of private and external non-market 
returns.  
A third approach brings an element of macro into micro, through e.g. the 
incorporation of some measure of average “system-wide” human capital (which is 
external to the individual or firm) into augmented Mincerian earnings functions, 
directly reflecting Lucas’s (1988) variant of endogenous growth. Examples include 
Moretti (2004), in which there is positive productivity spillover from graduates to 
non-graduates. The basic idea here is that productivity can be enhanced through 
human capital externalities arising from the interaction of graduates with non-
graduates and other graduates. Attention focuses on the coefficient of the external 
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human capital term. Again the approach is interesting, but controversial due to a range 
of econometric (and theoretical) issues, including the difficulties of controlling for 
demand driven effects on the proportion of graduates in the local labour force. More 
detailed description of this approach is provided in Section 3. 
McMahon’s (2002, 2004, 2009) dynamic simulation model of endogenous 
development draws on endogenous growth, but augments it in two main ways. First, it 
shifts the focus to the shorter and medium term and so to dynamics. Secondly, it 
broadens the focus in an attempt to provide a comprehensive means of capturing of 
externalities (in part through inclusion of Becker-like model of household time 
allocation). The approach is novel and interesting, though not specifically focussed on 
higher education. 
In the regional literature by far the biggest focus, in terms of HEI externalities, has 
been on estimating the scale of HEI spillover effects in knowledge production 
functions. The approach began by incorporating spatial effects more effectively into a 
knowledge production function in which the impact of HEIs is separately identified 
(Jaffe, 1989)
3
. In a wider context, studies of the knowledge economy encompass a 
broad range of typically more descriptive, case-study-based approaches, though the 
generality of their results is questionable (see e.g. Goldstein, 2009).
4
 Many of these 
analyses are microeconomic in orientation, but in principle the estimates of spillovers 
could be calibrated as a productivity shock in a system-wide model to simulate likely 
aggregate effects. In fact, here we draw on new micro-econometric evidence for the 
UK (Harris et al, 2011, 2012) to calibrate a total productivity impact. 
McMahon (2009, chpt 4) discusses private non-market benefits of higher education 
notably: own health; longevity; child health; child education; husband’s health; 
fertility; happiness; consumption and saving; job and location amenities; lifelong 
learning; consumption benefits. Haveman and Wolfe (1984) develop a general 
“willingness to pay” method for valuing the non-market private benefits of education. 
The basis is a model of household production in which marginal conditions are used 
                                                        
3 See Anselin et al (1997) and Varga (1998) for early examples. Acs (2009) provides a review of these 
and subsequent developments of this approach. 
4 There is recent UK evidence that strongly suggests that the “bugs and drugs” conception of 
“knowledge transfer” that has often been the focus of this literature is unwarranted: active 
knowledge exchange occurs across a very wide range of subject areas. See Abreu et al, (2010). 
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to value non-market elements that enter the household production function, most 
notably health. This approach is predicated upon some quite strong assumptions but 
proves to be very useful and allows progress to be made in challenging areas. 
McMahon (2009) details methods and sources for a range of non-market private 
benefits (including only studies that have income and education in the equation, so 
that income-equivalent benefits can be computed). He estimates that the non-market 
benefits to the individual are 122% of the earnings increase. This is huge, with 
obvious implications for the incentive for individuals to invest in higher education 
provided they have access to the relevant information. However, we do not pursue the 
analysis of non-market private benefits further in this paper, although our approach 
can, in principle, accommodate these impacts. 
3. A “micro-to-macro” approach 
Here we adopt a “micro-to-macro” approach to assessing the possible system-wide 
impacts of higher education externalities. The approach is straightforward in 
principle. Firstly, we select relevant micro-econometric evidence of the external 
returns to higher education. Secondly, we use this evidence to inform the specification 
of an HEI-disaggregated CGE model of Scotland, and to calibrate the nature and scale 
of the external benefits of higher education. We initially applied this approach to the 
private market benefits of higher education in Hermannsson et al (2010), by 
introducing appropriately scaled labour productivity increases in response to projected 
increases in the share of graduates in the labour force. In this section we briefly 
motivate our approach in the present context and outline the CGE model of Scotland, 
which we then use, in Section 4, to simulate the system-wide impacts of the external 
benefits of higher education in Scotland. 
3.1 The motivation for our approach 
Our “micro-to-macro” approach, at least in principle, has a number of advantages 
over the “macro-less-micro” approach that characterises most past attempts to 
quantify external effects. Firstly, we can identify the system-wide ramifications of any 
particular external benefit of higher education, or any group of such benefits, for 
which there exists micro-econometric evidence. This would also allow an analysis of 
any interdependencies that may characterise the impact of particular external benefits. 
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The “macro-less-micro” approach assumes that the totality of external impacts is 
correctly measured by the estimated macro (growth) equation. The “macro-less-
micro” approach therefore can at best only identify aggregate higher education 
externalities that are reflected in GDP, since it is assumed that the difference between 
the macroeconomic estimates and private market returns reflects the presence and 
extent of the totality of externalities.  
Secondly, the micro-to-macro approach can, in principle, be used to measure the 
system-wide impacts of the non-market private benefits of higher education. 
McMahon (2009, chpt. 4) reviews and integrates this literature, and also notes that the 
“macro less micro” approach cannot, by its nature, shed any light on the scale of such 
benefits. 
Thirdly, the transmission mechanism from the externality to the wider economy can, 
again in principle, be captured by the model, at least in broad-brush terms. And the 
causal sequence is clear in any subsequent simulations of impacts.  
Fourthly, in one sense the micro-to-macro approach is a more coherent and 
transparent approach since it is not bedevilled to the same extent by the unavoidable 
problems of interpretation of models based on varying theories, methods, assumptions 
and databases as are the two elements of the “macro-less-micro” approach. Of course, 
such studies remain extremely useful, but there is merit in exploring all approaches to 
assessing the scale of social benefits given the limited work in this area, including, we 
believe, further development of the micro-to-macro approach developed here.  
Fifthly, while the “macro-less-micro” approach can be implemented at the regional 
level that is our present focus, this is not straightforward given the quality and 
availability of regional data generally, which has limited the application of economic 
growth models in a UK regional context. However, the modelling framework that 
makes the “micro-to-macro” approach feasible can readily be implemented at the 
level of the regions, provided an appropriate input-output table exists, as we illustrate 
here with an application to Scotland. 
Finally, the estimated total external effects calculated based on “macro-less-micro” 
approach can be used to inform scenarios in “micro-to-macro” approach. We do this 
in the last section using Topel’s (1999) results for the macro component and 
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Psacharopoulos and Patrinos’s (2002) for the micro element as reported in McMahon 
(2009).  
While we believe the advantages of our general approach to be important, we would 
emphasise the illustrative nature of this particular application, given that there 
currently exists very little relevant Scottish (or indeed UK) evidence on external 
returns to higher education. We are therefore compelled to draw on evidence from 
elsewhere to determine the nature, and calibrate the scale, of at least one of the 
external benefits that we explore in order to illustrate the implementation of our 
approach. Furthermore, we are not comprehensive in our coverage of external effects, 
although we do attempt to provide some indication of the possible overall scale of the 
external benefits of higher education. In this paper we consider the evidence of three 
examples of positive externalities of higher education, and then consider external 
benefits as a whole based on “macro-less-micro” approach. 
3.2 AMOS: A macro-micro model of Scotland 
AMOS is a CGE modelling framework parameterised on the data from Scotland.
5
  
Essentially, it is an intertemporal, multisectoral, general equilibrium, empirical 
implementation of a Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, 2005) model of a regional 
economy. It has three domestic transactor groups, namely the household sector, 
corporations and government; and four major components of final demand: 
consumption, investment, government expenditure and exports. There are twenty five 
commodities/activities. 
Consumption and investment decisions reflect intertemporal optimization with perfect 
foresight (Lecca et al, 2010).
6
 Real government expenditure is equal to its base year 
level. The demand for Rest of the UK and Rest of the World exports is determined via 
conventional export demand functions for which the price elasticity of demand is set 
at 2.0. Imports are obtained through an Armington link (Armington, 1969) and 
therefore relative-price sensitive with trade substitution elasticities of 2.0 (Gibson, 
1990). 
                                                        
5 AMOS is an acronym for a macro-micro model of Scotland. The model is calibrated using a 
Social Accounting Matrix based around the 2006 Scottish Input-Output Tables. 
6 The details are given in Appendix 1. The intertemporal dimension of the model is based on Abel 
and Blanchard (1983). 
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In all of the simulations in this paper we impose a single Scottish labour market 
characterised by perfect sectoral mobility. All sectors are taken to be perfectly 
competitive and produce using multi-level CES production functions with elasticities 
of substitution of 0.3 (Harris, 1989). The model is characterised by a multi-level 
production structure. At the highest level gross output in each sector is produced by a 
Leontief production function of value-added and intermediate inputs. The value-
added is a CES function of labour and capital inputs, and technical change can 
augment labour, capital, or both. In implementing the simulations based on results 
reported in Harris et al (2011, 2012) we apply the shock to total factor productivity, 
so it takes the form of Hicks-neutral technical change. In all the other simulations we 
shock only labour productivity, as in a Harrod-neutral technical change. We do not 
explicitly model financial flows, our assumption being that Scotland is a price-taker in 
the competitive UK financial markets.  
As regards demographic developments, we assume no natural population change and 
no migration to isolate the effect of HEIs from the effect of changing size of the 
labour force. Wage setting is determined by a regional bargained real wage function 
that embodies the econometrically derived specification given in Layard et al (1991), 
. In this function the real wage is negatively related to the level of unemployment in 
the region, reflecting labour’s lower bargaining power in such circumstances.  
4. Simulation strategy and results 
We illustrate our approach by focussing on three individual effects with clear 
transmission mechanisms: the stimulus to total factor productivity as a consequence 
of establishments’ interaction with HEIs, the impact of graduates on the productivity 
of non-graduates (and other graduates) and the impact of increased investment in 
higher education as a result of public saving due to a crime reducing effect of 
education. Later we make an attempt to estimate an aggregate effect of external 
returns to education.  
4.1 The impact of HEIs on total factor productivity 
Simulation strategy 
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Harris et al (2011) investigate the impact of HEI-firm knowledge links on 
establishment-level total factor productivity (TFP) in Great Britain, using a dataset 
that merges the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) with the Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD). The basic model estimated is a production function, augmented to 
include the impact of any establishment-level engagement with HEIs (as captured in 
the CIS): 
yi = α + βEei + βKki + βxxi + βATTHEIi + εi  (1) 
where: lower case letters indicate logarithms, Ei is employment in firm i, Ki is capital 
stock, xi is a vector of control variables and HEIi is a dummy variable that equals 
unity if the establishment  collaborates with HEIs in innovation, and zero otherwise.  
Notice that βATT is a measure of the impact of HEIs on enterprises through their 
“sourcing knowledge from HEIs and/ or cooperating on innovation with HEIs” on 
TFP, since the latter is measured simply by moving the terms in capital and 
employment to the left-hand-side of the equation, and we interpret this coefficient 
here as indicating the presence of a positive externality of HEIs on total factor 
productivity. But it has to be noted that since the precise nature of the co-operation is 
not known it may be that some part (or all) of this is internalised (e.g., in the form of 
research grants). When estimated on all industries in Great Britain, with a matched 
sample based on propensity score matching, Harris et al (2011) find that βATT is 
positive and statistically significant, and indicates that collaborating with HEIs is 
associated with TFP that is around 12% higher, given all the control variables 
included. The impact is slightly reduced, however, when a dummy variable indicating 
the presence of an innovation over the period is introduced (which itself has a positive 
and statistically significant impact). This is as the authors expected, since the direct 
impact of HEIs is captured by the dummy variable, but HEIs also exert an indirect 
impact through innovation, as captured here through the introduction of the 
innovation dummy (Arvanitis et al, 2008). In this context it seems more appropriate to 
use the estimate of impact which is not “corrected” for innovation, otherwise we are 
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effectively “controlling away” one of the mechanisms through which HEIs in fact 
exert their impact.
7
 
The impacts were based on the 2007 CIS, so we regard the results as relating to 2006 
and interpret them as implying that the presence of HEIs increases TFP by 12% in 
firms reporting cooperation with HEIs, ceteris paribus. There are a number of 
problems involved in trying to deduce what Hicks neutral technical change shock 
should be introduced into our CGE model to reflect the Harris et al (2011) results. 
First, the estimated impact, of course, only applies to those establishments that 
actually report collaboration with HEIs (i.e. only to those establishments that 
indicated that they had either sourced knowledge or cooperated on innovation-related 
activities in the CIS). In 2006, based on weighted CIS data, 30.1% of GB 
establishments (in output terms) collaborated with HEIs, although this varied 
significantly by firm size (and by sector). Accordingly, if we are looking at the 
economy as a whole the scale of the impact on TFP on the basis of the GB estimate is 
3.6% (i.e., 30.1% of 12%). 
Second, this estimate is, because of the necessary dummy variable (“all or nothing”) 
characterisation of the impact of HEI activity (given the nature of the CIS questions 
on HEI collaboration), effectively a measure of the impact of a “hypothetical 
extraction” of HEIs on TFP. It reflects the total impact of the HE sector as a whole 
and therefore presumably reflects the impact of the stock of knowledge attributable to 
the sector. This suggests one approach to investigating the system-wide consequences 
of the estimated impact of HEIs: we could simulate the impact of extraction of HEIs 
on TFP (103.6 to 100 or a 3.5% reduction in TFP), although, of course, this may not 
be that informative if we are interested in the likely impact of marginal changes in HE 
policy. Nonetheless, it gives some feel for the scale of what are likely to be research-
induced supply-side changes on the Scottish economy, if Scottish establishments 
respond like those in GB as a whole (though note that the regional origin of the HEIs 
with which links exist is not identified).  
                                                        
7 The authors also report the result of including the percentage of the firm’s workforce that are 
graduates. This consistently has a positive and statistically significant coefficient throughout. The 
authors report that a 10% increase in the percentage of graduates leads to between a 0.6% and 
1.4% increase in TFP depending on sector and model. However, we regard this as simply 
reflecting a disaggregation of the labour input into graduate and non-graduate employment, not 
indicating the presence of a productivity spillover. 
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In fact, in a subsequent paper Harris et al (2012) report significant differences in the 
link between HEIs and establishment-level TFP across the regions of GB. In 
particular, they incorporate an interactive dummy between HEI impact and foreign 
ownership. They find a (weakly significant) negative link between HEIs and 
indigenous Scottish companies, but do find evidence of a large (31%) and statistically 
significant positive link between collaboration with HEIs and the productivity of 
foreign-owned firms in Scotland. The authors interpret this as evidence supporting the 
assessment of the Scottish innovation system in Roper et al (2006), who argue that 
there is a lack of absorptive capacity of Scottish indigenous firms. This suggests 
another hypothetical extraction simulation, in which we simulate the system-wide 
impact of the reduction in productivity in foreign firms that the absence of HEI 
interaction with the foreign-owned sector implies. The equivalent stimulus to TFP (on 
a weighted basis) is 7.2%, but if the negative link to indigenous companies is taken to 
be genuine, the overall stimulus to TFP from HEIs is only 0.9%.  
Simulation results  
Table 4.1 presents the long-run equilibrium results of hypothetical extraction, in 
which we remove the estimated impact of a technology spillover on the Scottish 
economy (assuming Scottish establishments are like GB establishments), through a 
reduction of a Hicks neutral kind of 3.5%. In the long-run equilibrium all capital stock 
and population adjustments are complete. 
Table 4.1 TFP shock of 3.5%. Long-run percentage change.  
GDP 4.9 
Consumption 1.7 
Investment 2.3 
Total Employment 1.0 
Unemployment Rate -15.6 
Nominal wage -0.1 
Real wage 1.6 
CPI -1.7 
Export RUK 4.9 
Export ROW 4.8 
Capital Stock 2.3 
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Since we are here simulating the impact of a hypothetical extraction of the (positive) 
impact of HEIs on TFP, the impacts on GDP and employment are negative. To avoid 
confusion we present the positive numbers here. The simulation results suggest that, 
in a system-wide context HEIs, through their interaction with GB plants, stimulate 
GDP by 4.9%. Of course, this is not an impact at the margin, but indicates the total 
impact of HEIs (captured by a dummy variable in the econometric analysis).  
A key feature of the stimulus to TFP that the presence of HEIs implies is the 
beneficial impact that it has upon competitiveness (reducing CPI by 1.7%) and 
stimulating Rest of the UK and Rest of the World exports by 4.9% and 4.8% 
respectively. However, the impact on employment (1.0%) and capital stocks (2.3%) 
are significantly lower than the stimulus to TFP, with the upward pressure on the real 
wage serving to limit the scale of the expansion in employment. 
4.2 The spillover effects of graduates on the productivity of non-graduates and 
(other) graduates 
Simulation strategy 
In this section we take an example of results from the general approach that includes 
some indicator of the average (external) level of human capital in earnings equation, 
and interprets the coefficient on that variable as indicating the scale of spillover effect 
on the individual/ group whose earnings are captured in the dependent variable. The 
example that we are using is Moretti (2004), who estimates an earnings function in 
which external effects are measured through the incorporation of an external, city-
wide, measure of human capital, namely the share of college graduates. 
We are interested in the external impact of graduate share on the earnings of non-
graduates and other graduates. The underlying assumption is that the higher earnings 
reflect higher productivity. The fundamental source of such effects is a matter of 
some debate, but they have long been recognised as potentially important (Marshall, 
1890), and are the most direct way, at the comparatively disaggregated level, of 
testing for the effects that are the core of the Lucas (1988) variant of endogenous 
growth theory. The area is controversial, in particular in respect of the appropriate 
estimation and interpretation of the coefficient of the proxy for average human capital 
in the earnings equation. A number of researchers have adopted this approach, mostly 
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in a US context. The empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Rauch (1993) finds 
evidence of significant externalities, using earnings and rental rate equations, while 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) find apparent evidence of such effects for schooling 
using OLS, which largely disappear under IV estimation. Moretti (2004), reports 
significant impacts, and his work seems most relevant here in that he estimates 
external effects for groups with different education levels, high school drop outs, high 
school graduates and college graduates. Moretti (2004, 2006) suggests that the 
difference from Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) is down to: his inclusion of a time 
period in which returns grew; his focus on returns at the higher end of the earnings 
spectrum; his analysis being of city-level rather than state-wide effects (which he 
finds to be lower in his sample). This pattern of results, as Moretti (2004) notes, is 
broadly consistent with Kreuger and Lindhal’s (2000) argument that the external 
benefits to education at lower levels of the education system impact largely through 
reduced crime and benefit claimants, whereas at the upper levels they impact through 
technology and productivity.  
Lange and Topel (2006) argue that Moretti’s (2004) estimates must be regarded as 
upwards biased, given that they believe the notion of spatial equilibrium implies 
human capital intensities of cities may be demand driven (although Moretti (2004) 
tries to correct for that). On the other hand, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) must be 
regarded as providing a lower bound (though as noted above this is zero, at least for 
their IV estimates for the earlier period). It would be instructive to estimate these 
effects for the UK regions, given that spatial equilibrium seems likely to be less 
applicable here given a lower degree of labour mobility in the UK. As far as we are 
aware we have no comparable UK studies. 
Despite the problems, we base our estimate of the externality on Moretti’s (2004) 
estimate of a 1.6% hike in earnings for non-graduates and 0.4% for graduates for 
every 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of graduates in the labour force. 
However, the only component of this change that clearly reflects the presence of an 
externality is the 0.4%, since the normal market reaction to an increase in the 
proportion of graduates would be an increase in the non-graduate wage. To account 
for that we estimate the second conservative scenario in which we take 0.4% as a 
measure of the external effect on graduates and non-graduates alike. While this is a 
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conservative interpretation of Moretti’s (2004) estimated externality, the 
qualifications to our analysis are nonetheless substantial: the Lange and Topel (2006) 
critique of upward bias remains; the fact that the scale of these effects tends to be 
bigger the smaller the spatial scale, and that the estimates were based on US cities, 
while we are here dealing with a UK region. The reservations concerning the 
estimates are such that our simulations have to be regarded as illustrative of the ability 
of the micro-to-macro approach to capture the impact of this externality, given our 
assumption that these wage differentials fully reflect genuine productivity effects. 
To determine the scale of the productivity spillovers we first have to determine the 
projected share of graduates in the Scottish labour force. It will increase even with an 
unchanged higher education participation rate (given demographic processes and the 
higher participation rate for recent cohorts). After that we apply the external effects to 
determine the resultant changes in productivities of both graduates and non-graduates. 
Of course, if there were no change in the share of graduates, there would be no 
(additional) induced productivity change.  
We use here our own projection of the future Scottish labour force composition 
described in Hermannsson et al (2010). The central assumption is that the number of 
graduates from the Scottish universities after the 2006/07 academic year will change 
proportionately to the number of people aged 20-25 and that the retention rates of 
graduates within the regional labour force will be constant. The original skill 
composition is calculated based on age-specific shares of graduates from the Annual 
Population Survey as reported by NOMIS and 2006 population age structure. The 
future size and age structure of the potential labour force (population age 20-64) are 
taken from the 2010-based ONS principal population projection. The resulting 
projected share of graduates in the Scottish labour force is presented on Figure 4.1.  
The increasing proportion of graduates reflects the fact that older cohorts have smaller 
proportions of graduates than is true of the recent cohorts. Gradually younger cohorts 
with high proportion of graduates replace older cohorts with lower proportion of 
graduates. 
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Figure 4.1. Projected share of graduates in the Scottish labour force 
 
The incremental change in total labour productivity (ΔLPt) in each period associated 
with growing proportion of graduates in the labour force is calculated according to the 
following formula  
ΔLPt = (eg*gt +eng*(1-gt))*Δgt  
where gt is the proportion of graduates in the labour force in period t, Δgt is the 
percentage change in the graduate share of the labour force, eg is the external effect on 
the productivity of graduates (0.4%) and eng is the external effect on the productivity 
of non-graduates (1.6% or 0.4% depending on scenario). Based on these calculations, 
by 2051 the cumulative shock reaches 12.4% or 4.6%, depending on scenario.  
Simulation results 
The long-run results of the positive shock to labour productivity associated with the 
external effect of graduates on productivity of non-graduates and other graduates are 
presented in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2. Simulation results. Long-run percentage change.  
 Base scenario Conservative scenario 
Labour productivity shock 17.9 6.6 
GDP 18.5 8.8 
Consumption 4.4 1.6 
Investment 16.2 6.0 
Total Employment 1.6 0.6 
Unemployment Rate -25.2 -9.6 
Nominal wage -1.7 -0.8 
Real wage 3.3 1.1 
CPI -4.8 -2.0 
Export RUK 18.2 6.9 
Export ROW 18.4 6.9 
Capital Stock 16.2 6.0 
 
The stimulus to the productivity of labour, as a consequence of the increasing 
proportion of graduates over the period ultimately raises GDP substantially by 17.9% 
in the base scenario or by 6.6% in the conservative scenario and puts downward 
pressure on prices by -4.8% and -2.0% respectively. A major part of the impact here 
is through the stimulus to regional competitiveness, which results in a substantial 
increase in interregional and international exports. Of course, this reflects our 
assumption that the proportion of graduates is unchanged in RUK and ROW. There is 
a significant reduction in unemployment (-25.2% or -9.6%) and increase in the real 
wage (3.3% or 1.1%). Employment does rise in the long-run (1.6% or 0.6%) so that 
the general equilibrium demand curve for labour is wage-elastic over this interval. Of 
course, the fall in the price of an efficiency unit of labour (percentage change in real 
wage – labour productivity shock) stimulates the demand for labour in efficiency 
units, but in general employment can fall (and does in the short-run – see below). The 
increase in GDP exceeds the labour productivity increase because both employment 
and capital stock are increasing. 
The reduction in the wage per efficiency unit of labour stimulates the demand for 
value-added through its impact on prices, via a competitiveness and real income 
effect, and this in turn stimulates the demand for both labour and capital services. 
However, the reduction in the relative price of an efficiency unit of labour stimulates 
the demand for it relative to capital, through a substitution effect, and the ratio of 
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efficiency units of labour to capital increases. Nonetheless, the change in employment 
is less than that in capital. The capital/worker ratio increases, reflecting the greater 
efficiency of workers.  
The increase in the demand for labour and capital pushes up the real wage and the real 
rental rate. However, the overall level of domestic prices is falling because of the 
competitiveness effect, and the nominal wage and rental rates decline too. While the 
real wage rises, it does so by less than the stimulus to productivity, which means that 
the wage in efficiency units falls, so that the unskilled get squeezed as a consequence. 
It is instructive to examine the adjustment path of the simulated response of the 
Scottish economy to the projected increase in labour productivity associated with 
positive external effect of graduates on productivity of non-graduates and other 
graduates. Figure 4.2 plots the GDP response to this increase. The two lines represent 
results for two scenarios.  
Figure 4.2. The adjustment path of GDP in response to labour productivity 
increase 
 
The adjustment paths for employment are shown in Figure 4.3. Notice that 
employment actually falls in the first period, reflecting the various factors that make 
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the general equilibrium wage elasticity of employment demand lower in the short-run, 
including the fixed sectoral capital stocks in the first period.  
Figure 4.3. The adjustment path of employment in response to labour 
productivity increase 
 
4.3 The crime-reducing effect of education  
Simulation strategy 
There is a small but growing literature on the crime reducing effect of education 
(Haveman and Wolfe, 1984; Lochner and Moretti, 2001; Lochner, 2004; Machin et al, 
2011). The authors identify several factors that explain the negative relationship 
between the level of education and criminal activity. Firstly, education increases 
opportunity cost of criminal activity by both increasing the returns from legal work 
and increasing the cost of potential incarceration. Secondly, time spent in education 
reduces time available for participation in criminal activity. This is especially 
important for teenagers. Thirdly, education may reduce the chances of involvement in 
criminal activity by increasing patience and risk aversion. And finally, if we believe 
in humanistic role of education, it may change preferences and make crime a less 
attractive activity on moral grounds.  
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We base our analysis of the macroeconomic impact of a crime-reducing effect of 
education on a recent paper by Machin et al (2011). They estimate a causal education 
impact on crime using as an instrument an increase in the compulsory school leaving 
age from 15 to 16 in England and Wales in 1972. This law generated a discontinuity 
in the average age left school and proportion with no qualification for men aged 18-40 
who were born 1950-1965
8
. Simultaneously they observe a drop in the conviction 
rates
9
 for men leaving school after the school leaving reform.  
The biggest challenge in estimating the effect of education on crime participation is 
the correlation between unobservables influencing education choices and those 
affecting the decision to get involved in criminal activity. To overcome this difficulty 
Machin et al (2011) use a school leaving age dummy as an instrument for education 
as it is a strong predictor of education and is not correlated with the unobservables 
that are correlated with both education and involvement in crime. They estimate crime 
and education reduced form equations: 
 
and crime structural form equation, that is used for causal estimates: 
 
where Oat is a measure of offending by cohort a in year t, Eat is an education variable, 
SLAat is a dummy variable that take value 1 for the cohorts that are affected by the 
new school leaving legislation, Xjat is a set of other explanatory variables. 
In the regression that we use for our scenario formulation the dependent variable is 
log of property crime convictions per 1000 population, and education variable is share 
with no qualification. The data on offending from the Offenders Index Database is 
aggregated by age, gender and broad crime type (property and violent). The offending 
rates are calculated using population data from the Office of Nation Statistics (ONS) 
                                                        
8 Based on General Household Survey data for 1972-1996. 
9 From Offenders Index Database for 1972-1996.  
Oat = b0 +b1SLAat + f jX jat +nat
j
å
Eat =d0 +d1SLAat + j jX jat +Jat
j
å
Oat =q0 +q1Eat + s jX jat +eat
j
å
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and matched with education and other characteristics from the General Household 
Survey. 
The coefficient on the “no qualification” variable in a structural form equation is 
0.851 if the standard sample is used and 0.999 if the sample with inverse distance 
weighting, that gives more weight to the observations nearer to the discontinuity 
point, is employed. The interpretation is as follows: if the share of population without 
qualification declines by 1% the level of convictions for property offences (which is 
used as a proxy for all property offences) reduces by 0.851 or 0.999 per cent. We use 
both of these estimates to construct two scenarios. 
Our approach is to use the coefficients estimated by Machin et al (2011) as estimates 
of the reduction in crime that will be achieved as the share of graduates in the Scottish 
labour force increases. Given the lack of evidence for the crime reducing effect of 
higher education qualifications we adopt the estimates of Machin et al (2011) as 
proxies even though they are based on secondary education. We realise the limitation 
of the proposed approach but argue that it is justifiable for two reasons. First, the 
factors that are responsible for the crime reducing effect of secondary education are 
still at play with higher education. Second, the presented evidence is based upon the 
effect of a one year's increase in education participation, while it takes three years to 
complete an undergraduate degree. That is to say, by using the same coefficients we 
are effectively applying one third of the effects estimated by Machin et al (2011).  
The authors also estimate the social benefits from the crime reducing effects of 
education by doing a cost-benefit analysis. They use the Home Office report by 
Dubourg et al (2005) for estimates of crime cost and the British Crime Survey for the 
estimates of the number of property crimes. We also start by using the estimates of 
crime cost from Dubourg et al (2005) but apply them to Scottish criminal statistics 
from the 2008 Scottish Criminal and Justice Survey (SCJS). There are two differences 
between our approach and that of Machin et al (2011): we use crime by category, 
while they use average cost of all property crimes; and we only include “defensive 
expenditures” and “cost to the criminal justice system”, while they also take into 
account “insurance administration” and “cost as a consequence of crime” (cost of 
crime for the victim). The rationale for not including the latter two categories of cost 
is that we are trying the estimate the public savings as a consequence of reduced 
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crime and not the total savings (that include  private savings). The calculations of 
public savings associated with the crime reducing effects of education are presented 
in Table 4.3. Total savings rage from £ 4.0 to 4.7 millions. 
To convert these savings into a potential macroeconomic effect from crime reduction 
we propose a hypothetical scenario, in which savings from reduced crimes are used to 
finance additional places at Scottish HEIs. We estimated that in 2005/06 academic 
year one FTE student costs £5,315 of public money (based on the data from Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) on teaching grants to Scottish HEIs and total 
number of FTE students). This means that one graduate costs £15,945, as it takes 
three year to graduate with a first degree. Money saved from crime reduction would 
allow the funding of  252 to 296 graduates (depending on which estimate of the crime 
reducing effect we use) per 1% increase in the share of graduates in the labour force. 
For the percentage increase in the share of graduates in the labour force we use the 
same projections that were described in the previous section. We apply a UK net 
retention rate
10
, which in 2005/06 was 89%, to calculate the number of additional 
graduates who will stay in Scotland. Then we add them to the base line scenario of the 
projected number of graduates in Scotland described in Hermannsson et al (2010) 
with a three year lag to account for the time it takes to acquire a degree. As a result by 
2051 the total cumulative number of additional graduates that would stay in Scotland 
would be equal to 4,531 or 5,507, depending on the scenario.  
 
                                                        
10 Retention rates are calculated based on the HESA Destination of Leavers from Higher 
Education Survey (DLHE) for 2002-07. “UK net retention rate” is calculated as the total number 
of UK graduates employed in Scotland 6 months after graduation divided by the total number of 
UK graduates that graduated from Scottish universities. The retention rate therefore takes into 
account the retention of students from Scottish universities as well as the net inflow of graduates 
from other UK regions. 
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Table 4.3. Savings from crime reducing effect of education 
 
Classification in SCJS 
Classification in 
HO report 
Number of 
crimes 
Cost in 
anticipation, £ 
Cost to the criminal 
justice system, £ 
Total cost,    
£ thousands 
Public savings from reduction of 
crime, £ thousands  
      
Estimate = 
0.851% 
Estimate = 
0.999% 
Vandalism Criminal damage 350,376 13 126 48,702   
All motor vehicle theft Theft of vehicle 69,709 546 199 51,933   
Housebreaking Burglary 25,485 221 1137 34,609   
Other household theft Theft non vehicle 172,856  301 52,030   
Personal theft (incl. 
robbery) Robbery 109,793  2601 285,572   
Total property crimes  728,219   472,845 4,024 4,724 
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We formulate the scenarios in terms of long-term (45 years from 2006 until 2051) 
increases in labour productivity attributable to the effect of increased human capital 
accumulated by the Scottish labour force due to higher number of graduates. This 
effect is expressed as a labour-augmenting productivity shock. As an indicator of the 
productivity differential between graduates and non-graduates we use the graduate 
wage premium, allowing for a signalling effect equal to 10% of the wage premium 
(Lange and Topel, 2006). For simulations presented in this paper we use the baseline 
estimate of graduate wage premium from Hermansson et al (2010) – 45%. For 
justification of the selected level of wage premium and discussion of the link between 
the graduate wage premium and productivity, signalling effect and sensitivity analysis 
see Hermansson et al (2010). 
The scale of the productivity adjustment for graduates is calculated according to the 
following formula:  
K=(1-sig)*(1+wp)  
where: K is a productivity scaling factor of graduate relative to non-graduate, sig is 
signalling effect, wp is the graduate wage premium.  
The total productivity-adjusted labour force is calculated as the sum of non-graduates 
and graduates weighted by their productivity scaling factor. The size of the labour 
productivity shock for each year of the simulation is calculated as a growth rate in the 
productivity-adjusted labour force between 2006 and the corresponding year
11
.  
Simulation results 
The long-run results of the simulations demonstrating the potential macroeconomic 
impact of the crime reducing effects of education are presented in Table 4.4. In these 
simulations the increase in labour productivity is driven only by the increasing 
number of graduates in the labour force.  
  
                                                        
11 To eliminate the scale effect of the change in population, the series is divided by the change in the 
size of the working-age population during the same period. 
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Table 4.4. Simulation results. Long-run percentage change.  
 
Estimate = 0.851% Estimate = 0.999% 
Labour productivity shock 1.31 1.56 
GDP 1.35 1.61 
Consumption 0.32 0.38 
Investment 1.18 1.42 
Total Employment 0.12 0.14 
Unemployment Rate -1.87 -2.23 
Nominal wage -0.14 -0.17 
Real wage 0.24 0.28 
CPI -0.37 -0.46 
Export RUK 1.34 1.60 
Export ROW 1.36 1.62 
Capital Stock 1.18 1.41 
The labour productivity shock associated with a growing number of graduates funded 
by savings from public spending on crime produces a large positive impact on the 
level of GDP (1.3% or 1.6%). This mainly operates through an improvement in 
competitiveness (CPI decrease by 0.4% or 0.5%) which drives an increase in exports 
to the Rest of the World and the Rest of the UK (1.3% or 1.6%). In the long run, the 
overall level of employment increases (0.1%) because the stimulus to employment 
from improved competitiveness (competitiveness effect), dominates the efficiency 
effect that is caused as any given level of output can now be produced with less labour 
input.The increase in demand for labour and capital pushes up the real wage (0.2% or 
0.3%) and the real rental rate. However, the overall level of domestic prices is falling 
because of the competitiveness effect, and the nominal wage (-0.1% or -0.2%) and 
rental rates decline too.  
The time paths of GDP and employment in response to the discussed shocks are 
presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. the two lines represent two different scenarios.  
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Figure 4.4. The adjustment path of GDP in response to labour productivity 
increase 
 
Figure 4.5. The adjustment path of employment in response to labour 
productivity increase 
It is interesting to note that unlike the previous labour productivity scenarios based on 
Moretti (2004) there is no sign of the effect reaching its equilibrium after 45 years. 
The reason is that in this case the effect is self-stimulating – larger share of graduates 
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leads to lower crime, which leads to greater savings and financing of more graduates, 
which in turn increases the share of graduates.  
 
4.4.The aggregate social benefits of higher education 
Simulation strategy 
So far we have focussed on only two of the possible externalities associated with 
higher education. However, the scale of the problem associated with trying to identify 
and quantify each and every externality is daunting, although McMahon (2009, chs 4 
and 5) has attempted to do just that and McMahon and Oketch (2010) report their 
most recent estimates for the US and the UK. We do not have the resources or space 
to attempt a comprehensive analysis here. However, in order to give a flavour for how 
important the overall social impacts identified by McMahon (2009) may be, we 
explore this issue from a slightly different perspective. In particular, we ask what 
effect the overall social impacts identified by McMahon (2009) would have if they 
were expressed in terms of an equivalent stimulus to the private market returns to 
higher education (expressed in terms of higher earnings, which we assume indicates 
higher productivity). The impacts are those that would be associated with a stimulus 
to graduate productivity of a sufficient scale to produce the same total of private 
market plus social returns to higher education reported by McMahon (2009). Of 
course, this does not capture the transmission mechanism for all externalities. Some 
researchers do, in fact, argue that the flow of graduates is critically important to some 
dimensions of HE impacts. For example, Faggian and McCann (2006) find that the 
spillover effects from HEIs to innovation occur via the flow of new graduates, and 
can find no evidence of an independent effect of the type considered above. However, 
none would argue that this is the only possible transmission mechanism for HEI 
impacts. We are not, though, arguing that this approach accurately captures all 
transmission mechanisms, but rather that it merely provides some indication of the 
potential importance of the overall social benefits of higher education.  
The measure of social benefits is taken from McMahon (2002, 2004, 2009). The 
productivity increase that would be required to raise private rates of return to the same 
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overall level can then be identified and used as the basis of a series of productivity 
shocks to indicate the scale of overall social plus private returns to higher education.
12
  
We use the same projection of Scottish labour force composition as in the previous 
section, together with evidence of graduate productivity differentials, to simulate the 
system-wide impact of the increased proportion of graduates operating through 
conventional private market returns to higher education. We then express the social 
returns to HE in terms of an equivalent labour productivity stimulus, to explore the 
scale of the system-wide impacts that would be implied if the social plus private 
market returns were captured in this way. 
We begin by considering the impact of private market returns that we employ as a 
comparator. The basic principle of shock formulation is the same as in the previous 
section. The scenarios are formulated in terms of long-term (45 years from 2006 until 
2051) increases in labour productivity attributable to the effect of increased human 
capital accumulated by the Scottish labour force owing to growing participation in 
higher education over the past 50 years. This effect is expressed as a labour-
augmenting productivity shock. And again we use the same wage premium of 45% as 
a measure of graduates higher productivity, allowing for a 10% signalling effect (for 
detailed discussion see Hermansson et al, 2010). 
The scale of the productivity adjustment for graduates is calculated according to the 
following formula:  
K=(1-sig)*(1+wp)/(1-s)  
where: K is a productivity scaling factor of graduate relative to non-graduate, sig is 
signalling effect, wp is the graduate wage premium and s is the share of social benefits 
in total return to education (private market returns + social returns). Non-graduates’ 
productivity is assumed to remain constant.  
We estimate upper and lower bounds for the social rate of return. The upper bound is 
from combining Topel’s (1999) total rate of return to education from cross-country 
                                                        
12 While McMahon (2009 pp 240-244) also examines the value of social benefits using his dynamic 
simulation model of endogenous development, the attribution of results to higher education per se 
requires some judgemental input. However, he reports impacts of a similar order of magnitude to those 
obtained using the Haveman and Wolfe (1984) approach. 
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output per worker regressions – 23%, with Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) 
estimate of the private returns to education based on individual earnings data and 
Mincer regressions – 9% for OECD. For OECD countries the size of externalities 
turns out to be (23%-9%)/23%=61% of the total returns. The lower bound of 37% is 
from McMahon (2002), which is the result he obtained for the USA
13
. However, it 
should be noted that Heckman and Klenow (1997) find no evidence of significant 
social returns when they control for life expectancy. As we have seen other papers 
also find no evidence of social returns when they control for a wide range of factors. 
McMahon’s (2009) response is that often these controls remove a part of the return 
that should be attributed to higher education (including improvement in longevity).  
It should be kept in mind, however, that we are ignoring the private non-market 
returns to higher education in our analysis, although again in principle, it is possible to 
extend the micro-to-macro approach to accommodate these (while it is not possible to 
do so, using some other methods, including the “macro less micro” method).  
Simulation results 
Here we compare the results we obtain by shocking productivity to reflect only the 
private market returns from higher education with the impacts implied for two 
estimates of social returns, expressed in terms of an equivalent additional stimulus to 
private market returns. Table 4.5 presents the long-run effects for three scenarios.  
The first column shows the results for the scenario which assumes that there are no 
external benefits of higher education. The increase in labour productivity is driven 
only by the increasing proportion of graduates in the labour force and their higher 
productivity. It has a large positive impact on the level of GDP (6.0%), which mainly 
operates through improvement in competitiveness (CPI decrease by 1.8%) resulting in 
growing Rest of the World and Rest of the UK exports (6.1% and 6.2). The overall 
level of employment increases in the long run (0.5%) because the stimulus to 
employment from improved competitiveness (competitiveness effect), dominates the 
fact that any given level of output can now be produced with less labour input 
(efficiency effect). The increase in the demand for labour and capital pushes up the 
                                                        
13 In fact, the estimates obtained by valuing each external benefit individually using the Haveman and 
Wolfe (e.g.1984) approach (McMahon (2009, chpt. 5)), imply that the total social benefits to higher 
education account for 47% of the private market return to higher education. 
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real wage (1.0%) and the real rental rate. However, the overall level of domestic 
prices is falling because of the competitiveness effect, and the nominal wage (-0.8%) 
and rental rates decline too. 
Table 4.5. Effect of total returns to education. Long-run percentage change. 
 External benefits 
 0% 37% 61% 
Labour productivity 
shock 5.9% 8.7% 12.6% 
GDP 6.0% 9.0% 13.0% 
Consumption 1.4% 2.1% 3.1% 
Investment 5.3% 7.9% 11.4% 
Total employment 0.5% 0.8% 1.2% 
Unemployment rate -8.5% -12.5% -18.1% 
Nominal wage -0.8% -1.1% -1.4% 
Real wage 1.0% 1.5% 2.3% 
CPI -1.8% -2.5% -3.6% 
Exports to RUK 6.1% 9.0% 13.0% 
Exports to ROW 6.2% 9.1% 13.1% 
Capital stock 5.3% 7.9% 11.4% 
The second and third columns present the results for simulations with positive 
external benefits of higher education. The direction of results is the same but 
magnitude is larger. For example, GDP is growing in the long run by 8.7% in case if 
external benefits represent 37% of total benefits of education and by 12.4% if they 
account for 61% of total returns. It is important to remember that the results presented 
in the table show the total impact of higher education over 45 years, i.e. private 
market and external effects combined. Thus, the external benefits of higher education 
in the long run represent the difference between the second/third columns and the first 
column. For example, the long-run impact of external benefits of higher education on 
GDP is 2.8% is case if external benefits constitute 37% of total benefits and 6.5% if 
they constitute 61% of total benefits. 
The adjustment paths for GDP to long-run values, presented in Table 4.5, are shown 
in Figure 4.6. The lowest line shows the transition path for the scenario without 
external benefits of higher education, the middle line for scenario with external 
benefits comprising 37% and the top line for scenario with external benefits 
comprising 61% of total benefits. GDP approaches its long-run equilibrium level 
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gradually, reflecting the projected build-up in the proportion of graduates in the 
labour force. 
Figure 4.6. The total impact of the increasing proportion of graduates in the 
Scottish labour force on GDP. 
 
Figure 4.7. The total impact of the increasing proportion of graduates in the 
Scottish labour force on employment. 
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The adjustment paths for employment are shown in Figure 4.7. In the first period 
increase in labour productivity has a small but negative effect on employment. In this 
period the efficiency effect dominates the competitiveness effect. However, starting 
from the second period the aggregate effect becomes positive. Investors anticipate 
higher profitability in the future and consumers anticipate higher wealth, leading both 
to bring spending forward and increase aggregate demand.  
Finally, note that we have not addressed the issue of the scale and valuation of the 
private  non-market benefits of higher education that would have to be included in any 
comprehensive assessment of the total costs and benefits associated with HEIs. 
McMahon’s (2009, chpt 4) estimate that these are equivalent to over 120% of the 
private market return (of which a very substantial portion are health-related), suggests 
that they at least merit further rigorous investigation. If these impacts seem 
surprisingly large, McMahon (2009) would argue that this is an indication of a 
significant information failure, rather than an estimation problem (though there are, 
indeed, many of those to be overcome), with clear policy implications.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we adopt a “micro-to-macro” approach for assessing the external returns 
to higher education. In principle, the HEI-disaggregated CGE modelling framework 
that we develop allows us to assess the system wide impacts of individual external 
benefits or of non-market private benefits (or groups of either or both), in addition to 
the more intensively researched private market benefits of higher education. 
Furthermore, the transmission mechanisms from HEIs to economic activity are 
identified and causality is clear within the simulation framework. The approach 
therefore offers some potential advantages relative to the “macro less micro” 
approach that characterises much of the literature in the UK, in which macroeconomic 
returns to education are used to identify externalities when compared to 
microeconometric estimates of private market returns. Such studies can at best yield a 
measure of aggregate external market benefits as reflected in GDP (though this is, of 
course, a valuable contribution) and cannot be used to explore the non-market private 
benefits that higher education may convey.  
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However, our analysis also demonstrates the importance of the “in principle” 
qualification in the preceding paragraph: implementation of the micro-to-macro 
approach on Scottish data is problematic, given the very limited range and depth of 
existing microeconometric analyses of higher education externalities. Firstly, we have 
not generally been able to use Scottish-specific estimates of social returns to 
education, for the simple reason that they typically do not exist. Secondly, some of the 
studies of social returns to higher education that do exist are themselves exploratory. 
There is no counterpart to the breadth and depth of studies of the estimates of the 
private market returns to higher education, in the analysis of social or private non-
market returns for any country or region. Thirdly, we have not exploited the full 
possibilities of the micro-to-macro approach in that here we do not attempt a 
comprehensive coverage of social benefits of higher education; rather, because of the 
limited evidence, we simply try to provide an illustrative analysis of three types of 
externalities, and then an indication of the overall scale of social benefits if expressed 
in terms of “equivalent” private market returns. Fourthly, we do not attempt to assess 
the private non-market benefits of higher education, although the micro-to-macro 
framework offers this possibility. 
Clearly, the nature of an illustrative study of this kind is that the list of further 
research is challenging: indeed part of the motivation in attempting to implement the 
micro-to-macro approach is to reveal the extent of the current gaps in our knowledge. 
Firstly, and most crucially, there is a need for further microeconometric studies of 
HEI externalities in a UK-wide and regional context. While there are major issues to 
be resolved here, it is difficult not to believe that if the same ingenuity is applied to 
this as has already been applied to the earnings issue, significant progress is likely – 
as indeed a number of US studies already suggest. Secondly, once this evidence base 
is improved, the transmission mechanisms and appropriately specified behavioural 
functions can be integrated into a micro-to-macro model to allow an exploration of 
system-wide interdependencies. Thirdly, within the basic framework it would be 
comparatively straightforward to offer a finer analysis of impacts that distinguished, 
for example, among graduates by subject area and allowed for possible industry-
specific effects. Fourthly, the analysis can be applied to other regions and nations: 
certainly the CGE modelling framework can be implemented for the main country-
regions of the UK. Fifthly, there are issues relating to the issue of full spatial 
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equilibrium that should be further investigated in a UK context, especially given that 
labour mobility among UK regions is significantly lower than in the US. Sixthly, but 
closely related, is the need for an explicitly interregional framework that can 
accommodate the interdependencies of the regional higher education systems of the 
UK, and of their host regions through trade and factor flows. Finally, the complexity 
of spillovers in the context of a system of multi-level governance raises issues of the 
appropriate coordination of higher education and other policies across UK regions. 
The impending funding challenges for higher education add to the urgency of research 
into these key policy issues. However, the potential scale of externalities presents a 
particular challenge for those who support HE funding policies that appear to be 
predicated on an implicit assumption that the external benefits of HE are negligible. 
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Appendix 1: Forward Looking Consumption and Production 
 
A1.1 Consumer Preference 
 
The decision problem for the representative consumer is to choose a sequence of 
consumption that maximizes the present value of utility, as summarized by the 
lifetime utility function: 
; ; (A1.1) 
discounted by the consumer’s rate of time preference and with constant elasticity of 
marginal utility . The present value of consumption must not exceed 
total wealth, W; where  and  is the interest rate which is kept 
constant over time. In our configuration we distinguish between financial wealth 
(FW) and non financial wealth (NFW), such that and in which: 
 
 
(A1.2
) 
 
The variables , ut and  are respectively working population, nominal 
wage rate before tax, the transfer matrix between households (h) and domestic no-
governmental institutions (dngins), the unemployment rate and the rate of income tax. 
The transfer from the Government (TRG), remittance (REM) and the exchange rate (
) are fixed.  
Financial Wealth (FW) evolves as follows: 
 (A1.3) 
where 
 
and  are respectively capital income and saving. In the model saving can be 
obtained as a function of the current level of income and interest rate (which is the 
default closure)  
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income. Household demand for regional and imported goods is the result of the intra-
temporal cost minimization problem. 
 
A1.2. Technology  
 
A1.2.1 Production. Intermediate inputs (VV), labour (L) and capital (K) constitute the 
production inputs of the model. L and K are combined in a CES production function 
in order to produce value added, Y, allowing for substitution among primary factors of 
production while Leontief technology between VV and Y is imposed. Intermediate 
goods produced locally or imported are considered as imperfect substitutes. 
 
A1.2.2 Investment. The decision problem of the representative firm is to choose the 
path of investment that maximize the present value of its cash flow given by profit, , 
less investment expenditure, I subject to the presence of adjustment cost  where 
: 
Max  subject to  (A1.4) 
The solution of the dynamic problem gives us the law of motion of the shadow price 
of capital, and the time path of investment related on the tax-adjusted Tobin’s q and 
an adjustment cost parameter :  
;      ; (A1.5) 
where Pk is the replacement cost of capital, rk is the rate of return to capital and b is a 
calibrated parameter.  
 
The model calibration process assumes the economy to be initially in steady state 
equilibrium. The parameters of the models are obtained from the Scottish SAM for 
the year 2004 by means of the usual calibration method. The value of adjustment cost 
parameter z in equations (XX) is assigned values 1.5. The world interest rate is set to 
0.04, the rate of depreciation to 0.15 and the constant elasticity of marginal utility  is 
equal to 0.9. Given the value of total investment, J, through the capital matrix, KMi,j, 
the equality condition with total investment by origin in the SAM holds true. The 
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price of capital goods, Pk, is set equal to unity since the benchmark prices on the 
consumption side are set equal to unity. W corresponds to the discounted flow of 
current income, NFW to the discounted flow of net labour income, and FW is obtained 
by maintaining asset equilibrium.  
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